Communication channel established from a display to a device's camera is known as visual channel, and is helpful in securing key exchange protocol [16] . In this paper, we study how visual channel can be exploited by a network terminal and mobile device to jointly verify information in an interactive session, and how such information can be jointly presented in a user-friendly manner, taking into account that the mobile device can only capture and display a small region. Motivated by applications in Kiosk computing and multi-factor authentication, we consider three security models: (1) the mobile device is trusted, (2) at most one of the terminal or the mobile device is dishonest, and (3) both the terminal and device are dishonest but they do not collude or communicate. We give a few protocols and investigate them under the abovementioned models. We point out a form of replay attack that renders some other straightforward implementations cumbersome to use. To enhance userfriendliness, we propose a solution using visual cues embedded into the 2D barcodes and incorporate the framework of "augmented reality" for easy verifications through visual inspection. We give a proof-of-concept implementation to show that our scheme is feasible in practice.
INTRODUCTION
Securing connection to a server through an untrusted network terminal is challenging even if the user has additional factor for authentication like one-time-password token, smartcard, or a mobile phone. One of the hurdles is the difficulty in securely passing information from the terminal to the device, and presenting the jointly verified authentic information to the user in a user friendly manner. Using traditional channel to connect the device and the terminal, like wireless connection or plug-and-play connection, are subjected to various man-in-the-middle attacks. Even if a secure channel can be established, it is still not clear how the additional device can help in authenticating subsequent messages rendered on the untrusted terminal's display.
A number of recent works utilize cameras in the mobile devices to provide an alternative realtime communication channel from a display unit to a mobile device: messages are rendered on the display unit in a form of, say 2D barcodes, which are then captured and decoded by the mobile device via its camera. Although such visual channel could be eavesdropped by "over-the-shoulder" attacks, it is arguably impossible to modify or insert messages, and thus secure against man-in-the-middle attack. Visual channel has been exploited in a few works in verifying the session key exchanged over an unsecured channel, for instance seeingis-believing proposed by McCune et al. [16] . There are also proposals on verifying untrusted display, for example, Clarke et al. propose verifying the display screen using stabilized camera device [5] . In this paper, we take a step further by investigating authentication of interactive sessions, with consideration that most cameras are unable to cover the whole screen in a single view with sufficient precision. An example of interactive session is online banking application where a user can browse and selectively view pervious transactions, and carry out new transactions. A typical screenshot would contain important information like the user's account information, and less sensitive information like advertisements, help information, and navigation information, as shown in Figure 1 (a).
During an interaction session, after a session key ks has been securely established between the server and the mobile device (could be established using seeing-is-believing [16] ), there could be many subsequent communication messages that require protection by ks. These messages may need to be rendered over different pages, or in a scrolling webpage where not all of them are visible at the same time. We remark that it is not clear how to protect them. For instance, one may render the messages as 2D barcodes, each protected by the same ks. To view the message in a 2D barcode, the user moves the mobile device over the barcode, and the device will capture, authenticate and display the message on its display panel. However, as there are many barcodes associated with the same key, it is possible for a dishonest terminal to perform "rearrangement" attack: replays barcodes or shows barcodes in the wrong order.
The above attack arises due to the limitation that the camera is unable to capture the whole screen with sufficient precision. We treat the problem as the authentication of messages rendered in a sequence of large 2D regions, where only region in a small rectangular window can be captured at one time. There are a few straightforward methods to overcome the rearrangement attack. For instance, one may prevent the attack by requiring the user to scan all the barcodes with his mobile device, and all the messages will be authenticated and rendered by the mobile device. However, it is troublesome for the user to scan all the barcodes, and there are situations where the user only wants to view some, but not all, of the messages. In addition, it is less preferred to navigate and browse the messages (e.g. a large table of transactions) within the relatively small display panel. In Section 6, we will discuss a few other straightforward methods and their limitations.
Our solution is to use a barcode scheme that given a message m and a visual cue v, is able to produce a barcode image that not only carries m as its payload, but also visually appears as v (see examples in Figure 1 (b) and Figure 1(c) ). Our paper realizes such barcode scheme using technique borrowed from fragile image watermarking [15] , where the visual cue is the "host" image, and the payload is embedded as the "watermark". To embed a long message into several barcodes, our main idea is to have a visual cue on each barcode indicating its position. By visually inspecting the visual cues, the user can readily verify that the barcodes are in the correct arrangement. For example, in Figure 1 (b), the visual cues are numeric numbers increasing by 1 from left to right, top to bottom. The black dot beside the number "2" indicates that the barcode is at the end of the row, and the black block beside the number "8" indicates that it is the last (i.e. bottom-right) barcode. With the arrangement of barcodes verified, the user can then browse selective barcodes independently with his mobile device.
In our security analysis, we consider the four parties setting where a user, who has a mobile device, wants to interact with a server via a network terminal. We focus on three security models. In the first model, the network terminal, including its CPU, keyboard and display unit, is untrusted by the user, whereas the mobile device is trusted. This model is motivated by the challenging problem in securing Kiosks [11, 13] , where Kiosks are untrusted public network terminal like workstations in Internet café.
In the second model, motivated by two-factor authentication, we consider scenarios where both the mobile and the terminal are not trusted by the user, but at least one of the terminal or mobile carries out the protocol honestly. This is to reflect the concern that either the terminal or the mobile could be, but less likely both are, compromised. We found that under the first model, it is possible to provide both confidentiality and authenticity; whereas under the second model, although authenticity can be achieved, it is not clear how to achieve confidentiality.
In the third model, we take one step further and consider a tricky setting where both the terminal and mobile device could be dishonest, but they do not collude in the sense that they do not know how to communicate with each other. This model is motivated by scenarios where the terminal and mobile device are compromised, but independently by two different adversaries, for instance, a dishonest mobile device that always says "authentic" for whatever authentication it is supposed to carry out, and a network terminal which is remotely controlled by a malicious party who wants to deceive the user to accept a particular message. To detect such dishonest mobile device, our proposed method requires the mobile device to extract and produce a human readable proof from the authentication tag. A corresponding proof is also shown in the terminal's display and hence the user can visually verify whether they are consistent, as shown in Figure 1(c) .
In addition to security requirements, user experience is also important. Requiring the user to take snapshot of the screen is rather disruptive from the user's point of view. We employ augmented reality to provide better user experience in verification. The design of our 2D barcode and the subregion authentication takes usability into consideration and fits nicely in the framework of augmented reality. One example is as shown in Figure 1(b) . The screenshot displayed by the terminal is a combination of sensitive data and non-sensitive data like advertisement and menu. The sensitive data are replaced by 2D barcodes with visual cue as described before. The user treats the mobile device as an inspection device and places the mobile phone over the region to be inspected. In realtime, the mobile device captures and verifies the 2D barcode. If it is authentic, the decrypted message is displayed. The non-sensitive portion of the screenshot is also displayed as it is to help the user to navigate. We give a proof-of-concept system implemented on Android mobile phones and evaluate its performance to show the feasibility of our methods.
Organization
We formally define our problem and three adversary models in Section 2. Assuming the existence of a barcode scheme that is secure against rearrangement attack, we propose two protocols and analyze them under the three adversary models in Section 3. We give a construction for the required barcode scheme using visual cues in Section 4 and discuss the design of visual cue symbols in Section 5. We compare our solutions with possible alternative methods in Section 6. We describe our proof-of-concept implementation in Section 7 and measure its performance in Section 8. A discussion of existing work is given in Section 9. Section 10 gives a conclusion of our paper.
MODELS AND FORMULATION
There are four parties involved in our problem: the user, the server, the mobile device and the network terminal. Let us call them User, Server, Mobile, and Terminal respectively. In our framework, the term "user" literately refers to a person, and the mobile device is equipped with a camera, input device, a small display unit and sufficient computing power.
A summary of our notations is given in Table 1 and the communication channels among the four parties are as shown in Figure 2 . Note that there is no direct communication link between Mobile and Server. With 3G mobile network and WiFi connection widely available, one may argue that the model should consider such a link. Nevertheless, there are situations where the connection is not available due to cost or other constrains. In addition, there are also security concerns if the mobile device has Internet connection during the transactions: if Mobile can directly communicate with a remote malicious party, it may collude and conduct coordinated attack with Terminal and the malicious party.
We consider the following security models for the channel between Server and User: 
Model 1:
Terminal is not trusted by User, but Mobile is trusted and we want to protect both confidentiality and authenticity.
Model 2: At least one of Terminal and
Mobile is honest and we want to protect authenticity.
Model 3: Both
Terminal and Mobile could be dishonest but they do not collude and we want to protect authenticity.
In Model 3, we treat the dishonest Terminal and Mobile as two different adversaries AT and AM with two different goals. AT is the dishonest terminal and its intension is to trick the user to believe that a given message m is authentic. The actual value of m is not determined prior to the connection. We can view it as a randomly chosen message that is passed to the AT. The adversary AM is the dishonest mobile and has an easier goal: it is free to construct any message and trick the user to wrongly believe that it is authentic. An example of AM is one who always accepts whatever verification it is tasked to do. To capture the notion that they do not collude, we impose the restriction that AT and AM do not know how to communicate with each other, and the forge message m is randomly chosen. Hence, we exclude the attack where AT covertly sends the message m to AM through the visual channel. 
PROTOCOLS
We now give our proposed protocols for securing the communication between Server and User assuming we have a barcode embedding technique that can protect the integrity and confidentiality of its payload, and visible visual cue can be rendered onto the barcode to indicate the barcode location as in Figure 1 (b). Given a message m, a visual cue v, and a session key ks, let us write the barcode (represented as images) as B(ks, m, v). For clarity in presentation, we first consider the case where the message can be embedded into one barcode block whose size is small enough to be entirely captured by Mobile's camera with sufficient precision. Thus, we take the visual cue v as a single dot, indicating to the user that there is only a single barcode to be read. We will later study the case for multiple messages in Section 4 and Section 5.
We assume that Server has already established a long term shared key with Mobile when the user registers an account with the server. In additional, for model 2 and 3, we assume that User has established a password with Server which is secret to Mobile. Before each interactive session, Server authenticates User and Mobile to get a session key ks, which is to be kept secret from Terminal. A secure key exchange can be derived from modified seeingand-believing [16] and combination of the proposed method in this section. Due to space constrain, we do not include details on key exchange in this paper.
Server to User
Consider the case where Server wants to send a message mS to User. We propose two methods, denoted MS1 and MS2 (message from server), where method MS1 is more userfriendly compared to MS2, but it requires that Mobile is trusted.
MS1.
To send a message mS to User, the following steps are carried out. (1) Server generates a barcode image B(ks, 
User to Server
Now we consider the following methods MU1 and MU2 (message from user) for sending the message mU to Server. Method MU1 protects both confidentiality and authenticity of the message, whereas method MU2 protects only the authenticity but involves less user operation.
MU1. MU1 consists of the following steps to send a message mU to Server. (1) User enters mU to Mobile. (2) Mobile computes and shows User the encrypted form E kE (mU) T kT (E kE (mU)) in readable characters (for e.g. using uuencode). (3) User sends displayed string to Server through Terminal's input device. (4) Server accepts mU if the tag is valid. Below is a summary for MU1:
MU2.
In scenarios where the confidentiality of mU is not required, we can employ a more user friendly protocol MU2 as follow: (1) User enters mU through Terminal's input device, and Terminal forwards mU to Server. (2) Server generates a barcode B(ks, mU c, v), where c is a randomly generated nonce. Server sends the barcode to Terminal. Although involves more steps, MU2 is less tedious from the user's point of view, since User does not need to enter mU using Mobile's input device. The corresponding steps for MU2 are summarized below: 
Analysis
In this section, we analyze our methods under different adversary models.
Model 1 (Mobile is trusted)
In Model 1, we use MU1 for sending message to Server, and use MS1 for Server to send message to User to achieve confidentiality and authenticity of the communication channel.
For both methods, Terminal plays the role of a relay point for passing message and thus a malicious Terminal is the man-in-the-middle. Hence, this is the classical setting where the two end points (Server and Mobile) having a shared key want to communicate over a public channel. The cryptographic technique (encryption and message authentication code) can secure the channel and provide both confidentiality and authenticity.
It is clear that MU2 and MS2 cannot protect the confidentiality under this model as the messages are sent in clear through Terminal, and thus they are not suitable in this model.
Model 2 (At least one is honest)
In Model 2, we use MU2 to send message to Server, and use MS2 for Server to send message to User. We want to achieve authenticity of the message mS. We are not interested in confidentiality here. It is an interesting future work to investigate whether confidentiality can be achieved under this model.
Suppose Terminal is dishonest. In both directions of the communication, we can treat the barcode as the MAC of the message, mU and mS respectively. Since Terminal does not have the key used in generating the barcode, this is a classical setting and the authenticity of the message inherit from the MAC we used in the barcode construction.
On the other hand, let us consider the case where the Mobile is dishonest. In MU2, Terminal is honest and will forward mU to Server as it is, thus, it is impossible for Mobile to modify mU without Server notices. Similarly, in MS 2, since the actual message mS is displayed by the honest Terminal, User can compare the displayed message and thus any modification can be detected.
Note that MU1 and MS1 is not secure in this model: if Mobile is dishonest and change the message to m , there is no way for User or Server to verify it.
Model 3 (No collusion)
It turns out that the protocol we used in method 2, i.e. MU2 and MS2, can achieve authenticity in this model as well.
Let us first analyze MU2. Recall that the goal of a dishonest Terminal is to trick Server to accept a message m U . To do so Terminal must send Server the message m U , and obtain a barcode b contains m U and c. Server accepts m U only if the verification code c is presented. Since c is randomly chosen, Terminal is unlikely to succeed in guessing c. Therefore, he needs to get c from user. Without any hint from Terminal, Mobile is not able to display the message that the user is expecting. Now let us analyze MS 2. In this case the dishonest Terminal wants to trick User into accepting a message m S . To achieve the goal, it must display m S side-by-side with the barcode. As Terminal does not know the key ks he is unable to forge the barcode. Now, consider the dishonest Mobile. Recall that there is no communication from the Terminal to Mobile, the Mobile is unable to display the message m S which is required to trick User to accept m S . Table 2 summarizes the security and user friendliness of our methods under different models.
VISUAL CHANNEL
A main component in building our visual channel is the construction of 2D barcode with visual cues: given a secret key ks = (kT, kE, kV), a message m, and a visual cue symbol v we want to produce a 2D barcode B(ks, m, v) such that the cue v is clearly visible, and the message m can be extracted under noise. On the other hand, there are security requirements on the confidentiality of m and integrity of m and v. Any modification on m and v must be detected with high probability.
Construction Overview
There are a number of stages in constructing the visual channel:
(Encryption-then-MAC): Given m, and the keys kE, kT,
the message m is protected using encryption and MAC with key kE and kT respectively, and get m0 = E kE (mU) T kT (E kE (mU)).
(Error correcting): Error correcting code is then ap-
plied on the result m0, and get ECC(m0), let us call this m1.
(Embedding visual cue): Given a message m1, a key
kV, and a visual cue v represented as a 2D array of bits, the m1 is embedded into a larger 2D array of bits I which visually appear as v, Section 4.2 gives details on the embedding process. 4. (Adding control point and rendering): A set of control points(red dots in Figure 1(b) ) is then added around I for image registration purpose.
Thus, our barcode is a black and white image with red pixels.
Encoding with Visual Cue
When a message is too large, multiple barcodes are required to encode it. As mentioned in the introduction, multiple barcodes protected by a single session key are subjected to "rearrangement" attack. To detect the attack, we propose binding location information to the barcode using visual cue. This section gives a method in embedding the visual cue. Note that the process of embedding a visual cue to a barcode can be viewed as the embedding process in digital watermarking, where the visual cue is the host, and the barcode is a message to be "watermarked" to the host.
Given a n-bits message m1, let us arrange it as a x by y binary matrix where n = x · y and x is even. Let us assume that the given visual cue is a x/2 by y pixels image where each pixel is either 0 (representing a black pixel) or 1 (representing a white pixel). Therefore, every 2 bits in m is associated with 1 pixel of the visual cue, and together they can be represented with 3 black-and-white pixels in the final barcode. The 3 pixels are arranged in a "L"-shape as shown in Figure 3(a) . Let us call the 3 pixels as a L-block. The 2 3 combination of values in a L-block is divided into two groups: W and B. The L-blocks in W have more white pixels and thus the L-blocks appear as "white". Conversely, the L-blocks in B will appear as "black".
Given a binary value v1 ∈ {0, 1} of a pixel of the visual cue image, we want to encode two bits b1, b2 into a three Note: C, A, N are related to security goals and U1, U2 are related to usability. C: confidentiality is achieved; A: authenticity is achieved; N: none of C and A can be achieved. U1: no user comparison of messages is required; U2: no user input via Mobile's input device is required. pixels L-block, such that the brightness of the L-block can be adjusted according to v1. For instance, if v1 = 1, the encoding outputs only elements in W . Since there are 4 elements in W , it is possible to encode the two bits b1 and b2. Beside for the value of v1, there is no further constraint on how the encoding of b1, b2 to the 4 elements in W is to be done. In order to prevent the adversary from modifying the appearance of the visual cue, the mapping from the 2 bits b1, b2 to the three pixels of the associated L-block, p1, p2, p3 , has to be kept secret. Hence, the key space for encoding a bit pair is 4! × 4! = 576.
To decode a barcode, Mobile applies the decoding and decryption functions in a reverse order and ignore the bit v1. That is, it first extracts the bit pairs from every Lblocks, and get the message m . Next, error correcting is applied and the authenticity of the message can be verified.
Security Analysis
We would like our barcode scheme to achieve the following properties: (1)authenticity and confidentiality of mS and (2) the integrity of visual cue.
Authenticity and confidentiality of message
The authenticity and confidentiality of the message embedded in our barcode scheme rely on the security of the underlying encryption and message authentication scheme. Bellare et al. [2] show that when the encryption E kE achieve indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA), and the message authentication scheme T kT is strongly unforgeable (SUF-CMA), then the Encrypt-then-MAC composition method achieves IND-CPA, INT-CTXT (integrity of ciphertexts) and IND-CCA ((adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack).
Integrity of visual cue
An adversary may try to modify some L-shape blocks such that the visual cue on two barcode blocks are swapped, and thus, he can rearrange the two blocks without being detected. As discussed in Section 4.2, any modification of an L-shape block's brightness will have 1 4 chance of not being detected. Suppose at least β number of L-shape blocks have to be modified in order to deceive the user, then the chances of not being detected will be ( However, the above analysis does not hold when we consider the whole process of decoding, where the error correction is included. Recall that, due to inevitable noise, we need to apply error correcting before extracting E kE (mS). Therefore, when small number of L-shape blocks are corrupted, the payload m1 can still be correctly decoded. Hence, the choice of error-correction and the design of the cues cannot be done separately. Furthermore, some error-correction code can correct more errors than its guaranteed level in some situations. Due to the concern of forgery, it is important not to correct those errors.
To prevent an adversary from making small changes that can deceive the user and yet get verified, one design consideration of the visual cue is to choose symbols with large mutual Hamming distance from each other. In our implementation to be described in Section 7, we use numerical digits as visual cue, where the minimum hamming distance for two symbols is 14 "L-blocks" (for example, the number "1" and "7", "0" and "8"). We choose parameters of error correcting code that is able to tolerate 4 bits noise for every 63 bits. Note that modifying a "L-blocks" may result in two bits flipped, thus, the probability that an attacker can modify the visual cue of a barcode to another is less than Φ(3; 14, 0.75) = 3.98% where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution B(14, 0.75).
Modifying control points
The adversary may try to modify the control points and this may cause failure in decoding, giving a string of "random" bits which is unlikely to pass the MAC authentication check. Hence, modifications of control points at most amount to a denial of service attack, which is not our main concern.
VISUAL CUES FOR VERIFICATION OF MULTIPLE BARCODES
In this section, we discuss a few designs of visual cue, in particular, for barcodes appeared in a linear sequence, and barcodes rendered as table. Recall that the main purpose of the visual cue is to bind location information to the barcodes, so that User can visually verify that the barcodes are in the correct arrangement.
Linear Sequential Barcodes.
Consider a sequence of barcodes appearing in the order B1, B2, . . . , Bn. The order of appearance gives implicit structure of the encoded message. For instance, the message could be a string divided into substrings where each substring is encoded in a single barcode. Hence, it is important to protect the order of appearance, even if the user may not be interested in viewing all of them. A natural visual cue would be a counter, starting from 1, that is, the visual cue of block Bi is i. To indicate the end of the sequence, the last block contains a special symbol, say "." in our example, to indicate end of sequence. Table Structure .
Barcodes in
Consider a table of messages where each message is encoded in a barcode. The barcodes are depicted in the natural table arrangement: for any 2 messages in the same row, the corresponding barcodes are also in the same row, and likewise for columns. To protect the arrangement, we propose the following rules of assigning the visual cue:
R1 The numerical value of the visual cue symbol on the top row, leftmost block is 1. The value increments by 1 from left to right. At the end of the row, the increment process continues at the leftmost block of the row below if any.
R2
The rightmost block in each row has the additional cue which is a black dot indicating this is the end of row.
R3
The rightmost block in the bottom row has an additional large black rectangle indicating this is the last block.
Figure 1(b) shows an example of such barcode table. To verify that a table of barcodes are in the correct arrangement, User simply needs to verify the continuity of the counter, every but the last row ends with a small dot, and the last barcode ends with a big dot. It is easy to verify that by imposing the above rules, any insertion, deletion or rearrangement of the barcodes can be detected by visual inspection.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS
Besides using visual cues, there are other techniques to ensure that the barcodes are in correct order. This section compares our scheme with a few alternatives. In general, our scheme uses more pixels to carry the visual cue symbols. On the other hand, it has the advantage of requiring less user involvement, incurring less disruption and exploiting the terminal's large display panel. A brief illustration of the alternative methods is given in Figure 4 . 
Embedding a HMAC of all blocks.
In this method, given a long message mS, Server computes a HMAC for the whole mS and embeds mS and its tag into a few barcodes. During authentication, the user first scans across all the barcodes, then Mobile responds whether the HMAC agree with the content in the barcodes (Figure 4(a) ). If so, Mobile renders the long message and user navigates to obtain the required information. The advantages of this method are (1) the user does not need to verify the visual cue, and (2) the barcode is more efficient in the sense that it does not need to embed the visual cue.
However, there are a few disadvantages of this method. Firstly, the scanning process could be less preferred when the user only want to browse a subset of the message (e.g. a user who wants to check a particular record from a list of transactions). Secondly, it is not easy to navigate using the relatively smaller display panel in the mobile device. Furthermore, it is not clear how to extend this method to cater for the setting where Mobile is not trusted: one could display the message in both Terminal and Mobile, but it is not easy for the user to verify that the displayed messages are consistent when the message is long.
Encoding location hints in barcode.
When the message can be represented as a form of table, one may try to secure the authenticity by using the row and column attributes as location information: Given a table mS, Server first divides it into sub-tables, then it encodes each sub-table together with the corresponding row and column attributes into barcodes. When Mobile decodes the barcode, it shows the corresponding attributes of the sub-table as shown in Figure 4(b) .
The advantage of this method is that it does not require the user to scan barcodes or verify visual cues, and the user can readily browse a sub-table of interest. While rearrangement attack can be prevented as the row and column information are encoded in the barcode, this method is still subjected to deletion attacks: the adversary may remove or duplicate an entire row of barcode without being detected. Although the "deletion attack" could be patched by encoding more information, for example, by indicating the total number of barcodes, the user is required to be involved in tedious verification, like counting the number of barcode blocks.
IMPLEMENTATION
The usability of our proposed method can be improved using "augmented reality" as described in the introduction. We implemented a proof-of-concept system using mobile phones and personal computers.
Deploying Machines and Softwares.
We implemented our method on Android API targeting at OS version v1.6 (Donut), and tested on three mobile devices: (1) a Acer Liquid mobile phone running on Android OS v1.6 with a 3.5 inches 480 × 800 TFT display screen, 256MB RAM, 768 MHz processor, video streaming maximum rate at 20 fps; (2) a Motorola Milestone XT mobile phone running on Android OS v2.1-update1 with a 3.7 in 480 × 854 FWVGA display screen, 256MB RAM, 720 MHz processor and video streaming maximum rate of 24 fps; and (3) a HTC Legend mobile phone running on Android OS v2.1 with 3.2 inches 320 × 480 HVGA display screen, 384 MB RAM, 600 MHz processor, video streaming maximum rate at 30 fps. Let us call these three mobile phones phone 1, phone 2 and phone 3 respectively. We tested the system on three different display units: (1) a 19 inch flat TFT monitor in Dell model Optiplex 755; (2) a 13.3 inch display of a Toshiba portege M900 laptop; and (3) a 15 inch Dell CRT monitor. All configuration of the display units such as brightness resolution are reset to the default setting. Let us call these three display units monitor 1, monitor 2 and monitor 3 respectively. Figure 5 shows an example of our experiment settings.
Choice of Parameters.
We use AES with 128 bit key for encryption scheme, HMAC based on SHA1 for message authentication code, and calculator fonts of numeric digits as visual cues symbols. We use a (63, 36, 11)-BCH error correcting code [3] to correct errors. That is, for every 36 bits, we add 27 redundant bits and we are able to correct 5 error bits. 
Image Processing Issues.
We use oversampling technique to reduce the noise of a captured image: one bit in the barcode is rendered using 2 × 2 pixels. Let us call a group of 2 × 2 pixels a "superpixel". Such oversampling can reduce the noise due to misalignment and mitigating other artifacts, but it also reduce the channel capacity by a factor of 4. For image registration, each barcode has four 5×5 red dots at the four corners, helping the mobile phone recognize the starting and ending of each barcode. When two barcode are next to each other, we combine the adjacent red dots.
PERFORMANCE
In this section we measure the performance of our proofof-concept implementation in terms of error rate, frame rate and channel capacity.
Error Rate.
We measure the average error rate in reading superpixels with different phones on different monitor. A block 50 by 50 superpixels, together with the 4 red control points are displayed and captured by the mobile device. The errors could be due to motion blur, lens distortion, monitor's refreshing rate, inaccurate image registration, aliasing, and incorrect white balance or focus. Figure 6 shows the result of bit error rates of the barcodes when the four red control points are correctly detected, where the crosses are the bit error rate of a particular captured barcode, the blue plus symbols are the average bit error rates of different phone and monitor, and the red boxes cover the regions between first quartile and third quartile. Although the error rate is affected by the aforementioned factors, Figure 6 shows that the average error rate is acceptable for error correcting to be carried out.
Frame Rate and Decoding Rate.
Our implementation incorporates the framework of "augmented reality": we display the captured video stream as it is, and render the decoded message on top of the video in a separate thread. While the video stream is rendered close to the maximum frame rate of the phone model, the decoding and displaying of message run at a lower rate. The average decoding rate of our implementation is over 5 cycles per second running on all the three mobile phones.
Capacity of Visual Channel.
We now give calculation for the size of payload (size of mS, the message Server sends to User) that can be embedded in a block that occupies 10000 pixels (2500 superpixels) of Terminal's display unit. Recall that we used 2 × 2 pixels to encode 1 bit of the barcode, employed a (63, 36, 11) BCH error correcting code, and used L-block to preserve the related location. Thus the payload is 10000 × = 952 bits for such a block.
RELATED WORK
There is an extensive amount of literatures exploiting the camera as an additional visual channel for communication. Jacobs et al. [12] gave a method that establishes a channel from a controllable light source to a camera. McCune et al. proposed seeing-is-believing [16] , which carries out authentication and key-exchange over a visual channel established between a device's display and another device's camera. Clarke et al. [5] described a protocol to verify the content on the untrusted terminal by pixel mapping or optical character recognition with a mobile device. Wong et al. [24] built a prototype on a Nokia Series 60 handphone that provides 46 bits for authentication over the visual channel. Sharp et al. [20] gave a system where the sensitive information displayed in the public terminal is blurred or redacted, whereas the mobile device displays the content in the subregion around terminal's mouse pointer in clear. However, the location of the mouse is sent by the terminal and hence potentially a malicious terminal could send the wrong location without begin detected, and thus compromise message integrity. Garriss et al. [10] proposed a protocol that a user can leverage his mobile device to identify, verify Kiosk and submit VM to Kiosk for the user to work on.
Data can be transmitted to a camera effectively using 2D barcodes. There are many 2D barcode designs, for example, QR code [1] and the High Capacity Color Barcode (HCCB) [18] that uses colored triangles. Many barcodes are designed to encode data in printed copies. There are also proposals that use other types of sources in the visual channel. Collomosse et al. proposed "Screen codes" [6] for transferring data from a display to a camera-equipped mobile device, where the data are encoded as a grid of luminosity fluctuation within an arbitrary image. A challenging hurdle in using hand-held cameras to establish the channel is motion blur. A few stabilization algorithms are developed for handheld camera [21, 17] , and for 2D barcodes [4] . Similar to our scheme, Costanza et al. [7] suggested a technique to embed designs into barcodes to increase the expressiveness and to bring visually meaning to them. These systems recognize the barcodes based on the topology, rather than geometry, of the codes [8] , and were initially developed for tracking objects in tangible user interfaces and augmented reality applications [9] . Augmented reality has been exploited to enhance user experience on many applications including education [14] , gaming [22] , outdoor activities [23] . Rekimoto et al. [19] Using 2D barcodes as the visual tags in the augmented reality environment, where a camera can capture the barcode on physical object and link them to their information.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated how visual channel can be deployed to enhance security of the communication between server and user in various settings. We pointed out that although authentication of an individual barcode can be easily carried out, the interesting technical challenge is in the verification of the relationships among several barcodes. This leads us to look into the problem of "subregion authentication" where a user wants to verify selective small pieces of data within a large dataset. Although there are a few methods to overcome the problem, they introduce disruptions during the interactive session and are thus less user-friendly. To achieve seamless interactions, we proposed using visual cue to bind location information to the barcode, so as to aid the user in visually verifying the data.
Our protocols demonstrated that, the visual channel "enhanced" with the visual cue, together with the mobile device's input/output device, jointly provide more flexibility in designing secure protocols. Viewing from another perspective, our investigation highlights limitations of visual channel, for instance, the observation that confidentiality is difficult to achieve under the setting where either the mobile device or the terminal could be dishonest. Our solution serves as an interesting example where security is achieved by coupling computer's processing power with human perceptual system. The design of our barcode also serves as an interesting application of fragile watermark.
To illustrate the concept, we implemented the framework, tested on three mobile devices and evaluated it with three types of monitors. The performance of our system is promising and the usability is enhanced with "augmented reality".
